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political organizations are unable or are judicially prevented from man-
ipulating alternative sources of rewards, the final result of Elrod v.
Burns may be a major re-adjustment in American party politics. By re-
moving the patronage dismissal from the hands of political bosses,
however, the Court has reaffirmed its conviction that the health of the
American polity is found more in the freedom of its members to speak
and think as they choose than in the ability of politicians to grant favors
in return for support.
RICHARD F. RINALDO
Securities Law—Constitutional Law—Implied Waiver of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity under the Securities Acts—Green v.
Utah.' In 1974 plaintiff Maxine Green brought suite in federal district
court against the State of Utah and its Commissioner of Financial In-
stitutions (Commissioner) alleging violation of the antifraud provision
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," arising out of the state's reg-
ulation of one of its chartered financial institutions. 4
 According to
the complaint, Western States Thrift and Loan (WST) was an indus-
trial loan corporation organized pursuant to Utah statutes, 5
 which is-
sued securities in the form of thrift certificates, passbook accounts,
and debenture bonds." Plaintiff alleged that due to a series of severe
539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976).
Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of herself and as a class action on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated. Id. at 1268.
3
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
	 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) and rule 106-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.101)-5 (1976). 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of thP mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ....
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
539 F.2d at 1268.
Id. at 1267-68. See UTAH Com ANN. §§ 7-8-I et seq. (1968 Replacement Volume).
6
 The court assumed argueada that these were securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts. 539 F.2d at 1269. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7713(1), 78c(a)(10) (1970).
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financial losses, WST had been operating in an insolvent condition
during the years following 1965. 7 She further alleged that throughout
the period of WST's insolvency, the state's Commissioner, who pur-
suant to state laws had annually examined WST, knew of the com-
pany's operating losses" but failed to inform the public." Moreover,
plaintiff alleged that even when the Commissioner had the opportu-
nity to disclose this information in his biennial public report on the
condition of the state's financial institutions, he intentionally concealed
both these losses and WST's insolvency" through the use of a decep-
tive accounting device which made it appear that WST was not in-
solvent." Although these and other acts of the Commissioner may
have violated state law," the other acts of the Commissioner may have
violated state law,' 3 the gravamen of Green's complaint was that the
Commissioner had violated the federal securities laws prohibiting the
use of deceptive devices in connection with the sale of securities" by
knowingly permitting WST to operate in an insolvent condition, by is-
suing a misleading report, and by failing to inform the investing pub-
lic of WST's poor financial condition." On the basis of these alleged
violations of federql law, plaintiff sought to recover approximately
$52,000 in actual losses from the state." On behalf of itself and its
T 539 F.2d at 1268.
8 Under Utah state statutes, the Department of Financial Institutions is charged
with responsibility for the regulation of state chartered financial institutions, including
industrial loan companies. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-1 (1) (1968 Replacement Volume).
The chief officer, or Commissioner of the Department, is required to submit a biennial
report to the governor "containing a copy of the last report furnished by each institu-
tion under the supervision of the , .. department and any other proceedings had or
done by the department showing generally the condition of the businesses ... and such
other matters in connection with such business as may be of interest to the public
...." Id. § 7-1-3. The statute provides for annual examination of "every loan and trust
corporation" to determine its financial condition and compliance with the law. Id. §
7-1-8. In addition it is a criminal act for the Commissioner to "knowingly or willfully
[permit] the violation of any of the provisions of law for a period of ninety days by any
... institution under the supervision of the ... department .. .." Id. § 7-1-29.
" Brief of appellant at 3 n.4. Since the district court dismissed the suit on
eleventh amendment grounds, it made no findings of fact. See 539 F.2d at 1269.
'" 539 F.2d at 1268.
" Id. at 1268, 1269.
"Id. Plaintiff alleged that contrary to accepted accounting practice, the Commis-
sioner had reported a portion of WST's long term liabilities as assets. This accounting
practice made it appear that WST was solvent when in fact it was not. Id.
' 5 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-29 (1968 Replacement Volume). See note 8 supra.
14 15 U.S.C.
	
78j (1970) and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
240.I0b-5 (1976). See note 3 supra.
' 5 539 F.2d at 1268-69. Plaintiff also alleged the Commissioner had violated the
securities laws by failing to prevent WST from selling securities while insolvent; by fail-
ing to detect WST loans to companies in which WST officers had a financial interest;
and by "instituting and maintaining an unauthorized and unlawful constructive credit
to the capital accounts of ws-r which allowed it to make loans and advances in excess
of its capability." Id.
At the time suit was filed in 1974, WST had fallen into state receivership,
thereby rendering plaintiffs securities virtually worthless. Id. at 1269.
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Commissioner, the state moved for dismissal on the ground that the
eleventh amendment_ barred jurisdiction.' 7 The district court agreed
and granted the motion to dismiss." Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, seeking reversal of the motion and claiming that the state had
waived its eleventh amendment immunity to suit" by participating in
an activity subject to federal regulation." In affirming dismissal of the
action the court HELD: the mere regulation by a state of its own fi-
nancial institutions does not constitute an implied waiver of its
eleventh amendment immunity to a private federal court suit under
the federal securities laws."
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals examined three
Supreme Court opinions which form the basis for the doctrine of im-
plied waiver, 22
 and then compared three circuit opinions 23 which had
applied the waiver doctrine to suits brought against states under the
federal securities laws. On the basis of these opinions, the court of
appeals first determined that Utah's regulation of its state chartered
institutions was a governmental function. 24
 Because of this fact, the
court determined that in order to find an implied waiver of immunity
it was necessary to first find an explicit indication in the federal se-
curities acts that Congress intended to subject a state to private federal
suit when a state exercises such a regulatory function. Applying this
explicit intent test, the court concluded that the mere fact that one
section of the securities laws defines "person" as including "a govern-
ment or political subdivision thereof"25 does not amount to the type
of indication needed to show that Congress clearly intended to condi-
tion a state's participation in the regulation of securities upon a waiver
of immunity." Consequently, the court of appeals held that the ab-
" Id. When a private party seeks to impose a liability which is to be paid out of a
state's treasury, the suit will be considered to be one against the state, even though
nominally it is against a state officer. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 (1974);
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Thus, in Green,
because the suit against the Commissioner sought to impose liability on the state, the
suit was treated as one against the state and the eleventh amendment could be inter-
posed to thwart it.
'" 539 F.2d at 1269.
"Id. A second issue was whether the class action had been properly dismissed.
Id. However, as the court found that the state's eleventh amendment immunity had not
been waived, it did not reach this issue. Id. at 1274.
"Since the state had not expressly waived its immunity, see note 32 infra, the
question facing the court was whether it had impliedly done so. 539 F.2d at 1270.
21 539 F.2d at 1274.
22
 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
:3
 Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Kentucky, 513
F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975); Forman v, Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2nd Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
21
 539 F.2d at 1274. Had the court found the state's activity to be proprietary in-
stead of governmental, it might have applied a less stringent test in order to determine
congressional intent. See 539 F.2d at 1271, 1273-74. See discussion in text at notes
71.76 infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 776(2) (1970).
26
 539 F.2d at 1273-74.
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sence of such congressional intent resolved the eleventh amendment
question before it, and ruled that the state's eleventh amendment im-
munity barred Green's suit to recover her losses from the state. 27
The principal significance of the Green decision lies in its clarifi-
cation of the circumstances under which the Securities Acts may lift a
state's immunity from private suit in federal court. The case adds, its
weight to the trend of recent circuit decisions ruling that a state does
not waive its immunity merely by regulating securities-issuing institu-
tions within its borders.28 The decision also illustrates that a stricter
test must be applied to measure congressional intent to subject states
to private federal suit if the state's activity may be characterized as
"governmental" rather than "proprietary." 28
This note will first trace the development of the implied waiver
doctrine in the context of suits by private parties against states in fed-
eral court. Three major Supreme Court decisions, which both define
this doctrine in the context of eleventh amendment cases and create
the basis for the use of the governmental/proprietary distinction, will
be scrutinized. Because these Supreme Court decisions preclude an
implied waiver of immunity by a state unless Congress intended to au-
thorize private suits against states, the second section of the note will
examine the Securities Acts and their legislative history to determine
whether such congressional intent exists. The Green court's treatment
of three recent circuit opinions applying the implied waiver doctrine
to suits brought under the federal securities laws will then be
analyzed. In the third section of the note, the significance of the
governmental/proprietary distinction in eleventh amendment cases
and some practical considerations relating to the application of the
distinction will be examined. -
1. WAIVER OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
The eleventh amendment provides that "[Ole judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 2" Although on its face the amendment applies only to suits
" Id. at 1274.
9n
	
Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F,2d 993, 995 (6th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Ken-
tucky, 513 F.2c1 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1975).
29 See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284
(1973).
'" U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It should be noted that a state poSsesses two kinds of
immunity, which are often confused by the courts. First there is the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, which bars a suit against a state by its own citizens absent
its consent. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). In 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), the Supreme Court held that under article III of the Constitution ("The
judicial power shall extend to ... controversies ... between a state and citizens of
another state ... and between a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects." U.S.
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brought against a state by out-of-staters, the Supreme Court has "con-
sistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well ...." 3 ' The
amendment thus creates a constitutional immunity to private suit
which may be invoked whenever a state is sued in federal court. How-
ever, as is the case with other constitutionally created rights, a state
may waive its immunity to suit. 32 One of the ways a state may waive its
eleventh amendment immunity is by engaging in an activity to which
Congress has attached the condition of amenability to private federal
suit." In such a case the state will be held to have impliedly waived its
immunity to suit. 34
CoNsT., art. III, § 2) a suit could be brought against a state in federal court by an out-
of-stater. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 450-51 (opinion of Blair, J.), 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.),
476-77, (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (1793). The decision in effect held that a state's conimon
law immunity, which protected the state against suits brought in its own courts, was in-
effective to insulate states from private suits brought in federal court. As a result an
"outraged outcry of financially embarrassed debtor States fearful of suits in federal
court greeted that decision and resulted in the immediate proposal, and fairly prompt
adoption, of the Eleventh Amendment." Employees, 411 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). This amendment created a second, constitutional source of immunity, applica-
ble to suits brought against a state in federal court. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (supporting the view that the financial shakiness of the states
motivated the adoption of the amendment). See also Employees, 411 U.S. at 291 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1890); Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REv. 1, 6.9 (1967) (eleventh amend-
ment introduced to clarify the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution con-
cerning the reach of the federal judicial power).
31
 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Because much of the recent
eleventh amendment law has developed in the context of suits brought against a state
by its own citizens, this note will treat the amendment as applying to all private suits
brought against a state in federal court. See, e.g., id. (holding the eleventh amendment
harred a retroactive award against a state in a suit brought by the state's own citizens);
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973).
22 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
33 See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964).
" Id. at 192. There are two additional ways in which a state may waive its
eleventh amendment immunity to suit. The first is through an express waiver in the
constitution or laws of the state. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359
U.S. 275, 276 (1959). Because the eleventh amendment confers a constitutional right, the
courts have been reluctant to find an express waiver of this immunity unless it can be
"shown to he clear and unequivocal." Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 238 (2nd Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19
(1974). Therefore, if there is any indication in the laws of a state that it intended to
limit consent to its own state courts, such as by providing a procedure or remedy
anomalous to a federal court, a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity will not be
found, Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436,
438, 441(1900); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 55 (1944). The final
way a state may consent to private suit is by making a general appearance in federal
court. Such appearance may be to defend on the merits, Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1883); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906), or to
intervene to protect its own interests. Clark v. Barnard. 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). How-
ever, a limited appearance by a state in a federal suit will not be held to constitute a
waiver of its immunity. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933).
In contrast to an express waiver or waiver by appearance, which may occur in
the context of any type of suit brought in federal court, the question of implied waiver
808
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A. The Implicit. Intent Test of Parden
The doctrine of implied consent under the eleventh amendment
was first clearly enunciated in Pruden v. Terminal Ry," 5 where an indi-
vidual sought to enforce the personal injury liability provisions of the
Federal Employers Liability Act. (FELA) 3 li against a state-owned rail-
road engaged in interstate commerce. 37
 The Court"" first posed the
question whether in enacting the FELA, Congress intended to subject
a state to suit in these circumstances.39
 The Court found that it had,
basing its conclusion both on language in the statute which referred to
" 'every' common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce,"'" and
on legislative history showing that the Act was intended to extend as
far as the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce would
allow.' Furthermore, the Court reasoned that if Congress had in-
tended to "exclude a particular group of workers from the benefits
conferred by the Act" it would have done so. 42
 The Court thus con-
only arises in suits brought against a state under a federal regulatory statute. Further-
more, the issue only arises where it is doubtful that Congress could directly subject a
state to suit. Compare Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (Under the
commerce power, Congress may condition the right to operate a railroad in interstate
commerce upon amenability to private suit in federal court) with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment Congress may
directly impose liability to private federal suits upon states in order to prevent discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color. sex, etc.). See note 178
11 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
3
 45 U.S.C.§§!51et.seq.(1970). The FELA provides in part that "[elvery common
carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States ...
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while employed by such carrier
in such commerce § 51.
37
 377 U.S. at 184.85.
39
 Justice  Brennan spoke I'irr the majority in a 5.4 decision.
39 377 U.S. at 187.
"Id., quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
41
 377 U.S. at 187 11.5. To support its conclusion that Congress intended the lia-
bility provisions of the Act to apply to a state, the Court cited two earlier opinions in
which similar broad language in other federal railway statutes hall been held to em-
brace state owned railroads, Id. at 187-89. In United States v, California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the words "ally common carrier engaged
in interstate commerce by railroad" in the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6
(1970), included stated owned railroads within their scope. 297 U.S. at 185-87. As a re-
sult, the United States was allowed to recover a $100 statutory penalty fOr permitting
the use of substandard couplers. Later, in California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), by
virtue Of similar language in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970) ("any
... carrier by railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act," id, § 151), the Court
held that the same state railroad was bound by the substantive provisions of that Act.
353 U.S. at 554. Neither ease involved an attempt by a private party to sue the mate, as
in Parden, however, and the Court in Taylor specifically reserved consideration of
whether the eleventh amendment would bar an employee of the railroad from enforc-
ing an award of damages by the National Railway Adjustment Board against a state in
federal court. Id. at 568 n.16. Thus these cases focused only upon whether Congress in-
tended the substantive provisions of the acts to apply to states and not upon whether
Congress intended to affect it mate's immunity from private suit.
" 377 U.S. at 190.
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eluded that Congress intended the liability for personal injury provi-
sions of the FELA to apply to states."
The Court also found sufficient indication that Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits against states under the Act. "To
read a 'sovereign immunity exception' into the Act," the Court ar-
gued, "would result in a right without a remedy," 44 since employees
who had been given a right under the FELA to be compensated by
their employer would be left without a means of enforcing that right.
The Court was "unwilling to conclude that Congress intended so
pointless and frustrating a 'result."'" Thus the Court found implicit in
the FELA a congressional intent to subject states to private suit, even
though the Act. nowhere mentioned states, and even though Congress
apparently never considered that the Act might infringe upon a state's
eleventh amendment immunity from suit."
After determining that Congress intended to authorize private
suits against a state, the Court then addressed the question whether
the national government possessed the power to subject a state to suit
as against a state's claim of immunity. The Court first found that "by
empowering Congress to regulate commerce [upon ratifying the
Constitution] the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their
sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation."'" There-
' fore, the Court concluded, it was within Congress' power to create a
cause of action against states pursuant to its plenary power to regulate
interstate commerce." However, instead of holding that this surren-
der of sovereign immunity gave Congress power to "directly strip a
state of its sovereign immunity" 4" without the state's consent, the
Court concluded that in enacting the FELA, "Congress conditioned the
right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to
suit in federal court"5" and that Alabama, by thereafter operating an
interstate railroad, itnpliedly consented to suit tinder the FELA. 5 '
"Id. at 189-90.
"Id.
45 Id.
" Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 192. The Court continued: "Since imposition of the FELA right of action
is within the congressional regulatory power, it must follow that application of the Act
to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity." Id. The Court also
quoted New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946): 11:11y engaging in the
railroad business a State cannot withdraw the railroad from the power of the federal
government to regulate commerce." 377 U.S. at 192 n.10.
" 377 U.S. at 191-92. See note 47 supra.
" Id. at 194 n.11.
"Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
" Id. The Court explained:
Recognition of the congressional power to render a State suable
under the FELA does not mean that the immunity doctrine, as embodied
in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to citizens of other States and as
extended to the State's own citizens by (Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I
(1890)1 is here being overridden. It remains the law that a State may not
be sued by an individual without its consent. Our conclusion is simply that
810
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The majority in Parden thus based its decision to allow the pri-
vate suit for damages against the state upon four legal determina-
tions: 1) that Congress intended to create a substantive right in em-
ployees of state owned railroads; 2) that Congress intended to allow
private parties to enforce that remedy through a suit for damages
against a state in federal court; 3) that Congress possessed the con-
stitutional authority" to render a state amenable to suit by private
parties in federal court; and 4) that the state consented to such suits.
Assuming these four elements may be found, Parden stands for the
proposition that when a state becomes involved in an activity already
regulated by Congress under the commerce power, it will be deemed
to have waived its immunity to suit brought under that regulation.
The four man dissent in Parden agreed with the majority that
Congress could "condition a State's permit to engage in the interstate
transportation business on a waiver of ... immunity."53 However, the
dissenters would have required "that if' Congress decides to ... condi-
tion privileges within its control on the forfeiture of constitutional
Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately
20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as
was authorized by that Act,
Id, (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that the federal regulation was in effect before the
state began the operation of its railroad appeared to be necessary to the Court's finding
of consent. The case has been so interpreted. See Forman v. Community Servs., Inc.,
500 F,2d 1246, 1256 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979), reed on other grounds, 421 U.S. 837 (1975);
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, '296 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). Further support for this view may be found in a footnote in
Parden, where Justice Brennan discussed the respondent's argument that Congress has
no power to "directly strip a State of its sovereign immunity";
That Congress could not make a Slate suable upon all causes of ac-
tion does not mean that it cannot do so with respect to this particular
cause of action, where imposition of such liability is within its power to
regulate commerce and where the State, by operating a railroad in interstate
commerce, has voluntarily submitted itself to that power.
377 U.S. at 193-94 n.11 (emphasis added). See also id. at 195 n.13. Thus, despite his
later disclaimers, see note 56 infra, Justice Brennan seemed to indicate that some volun-
tariness, such as that found when a state becomes involved in an activity already under
federal regulation, was necessary to his finding that Alabama consented to suit. See
note 76 infra.
Justice Brennan's mention of the eleventh amendment is inexplicable in light of
his later analysis of the significance of Parden. See Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 300, 309 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dis-
sent in Employees, Brennan claimed "Parden regarded the Eleventh Amendment to he
inapplicable to suits against a State brought by its own citizens in federal court and held
that whether the FELA suit was maintainable turned on the availability to Alabama of
the protection of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id. at 309. Brennan also
maintained that "Parden held that the States had surrendered the protection of
sovereign immunity in federal court suits authorized by Congress pursuant to the
States' grant to Congress of the commerce power." Id. at 300. Thus, it is clear that
Brennan really meant that Alabama consented to suit not when it operatecra railroad
after the FELA was enacted but when it operated a railroad after giving Congress
power to regulate interstate commerce. See note 56 infra.
51 In Parden the congressional authority stemmed from the commerce power.
U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 3.
53 377 U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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rights, its intention to do so should appear with unmistakable
clarity."54
 Finding no clear indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended that a state which operated a railroad in interstate
commerce would automatically be deemed to have waived its
immunity, 55
 the dissenters protested, "the majority in effect holds that
. waiver of a constitutional privilege need be neither knowing nor
intelligent."50
 Thus the dissenters would have required an affirmative
showing of intent to subject a state to private federal suit before an
implied waiver of immunity could be found. Additionally, they would
have invoked a higher standard to determine whether the state con-
sented to be sued—and would not have found a waiver of a state's
immunity unless it was shown to be knowing and intelligent.
H. The Explicit Intent Test of Employees
In the second Supreme Court case bearing on implied consent,
Employees v. Department gl Public Health and Welfare," the view of the
dissenters in Parden prevailed. At issue was whether employees of the
Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri could sue the
state in federal court for overtime compensation 58 due them under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937 (FLSA). 59
 Originally, the FLSA
specifically exempted state employees from the provisions of the
Act," but in 1966 Congress amended the Act specifically to include
Si Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 200. That Justice Brennan did in fact mean that a state's waiver could be
neither knowing nor intelligent is clear from his dissent in Employees v. Department of
Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298-324 (1973). There he maintained that
Parden found the eleventh amendment not applicable to suits brought against a state in-
federal court by its own citizens. Therefore the only question to be decided was
whether the state could invoke the common law and nonconstitutional doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Id. at 309. In addition, according to Justice Brennan, Parden found
that the states had surrendered their immunity to federal court suits in the commerce
area when they adopted the Constitution. Id. at 299. Furthermore, he would continue
the trend against finding governmental immunity except where absolutely required by a
literal reading of the Constitution. Id. at 323.
However, as Justice Douglas pointed out, writing for the majority in Employees, if
the question were so simple, then why in Parden did the Court even pursue the ques-
tion of waiver? Id. at 280 11.1. If only a state's sovereign immunity and not its constitu-
tional immunity were at stake in Parden, there would have been no need "to reach the
question of waiver or consent, for Congress could subject the States to suit by their own
citizens whenever it was deemed necessary or appropriate to the regulation of com-
merce." Id. Furthermore, as Justice Douglas noted, "there can be no doubt that the
Court's holding in Parden was premised on the conclusion that Alabama, by operating
the railroad, had consented to suit in the federal courts under FELA." Id. See note 51
supra.
57
 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
59 Id. at 281.
59 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970). The FLSA provides for minimum wages, id. §
206, and minimum overtime compensation, id. § 207, for certain employees in enter-
prises affecting interstate commerce. .
6° Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
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certain employees of state-run hospitals, institutions, and schools
within its minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions." As
employees of state health facilities, plaintiffs were included by the
1966 amendments."
justice Douglas, writing for the Court, conceded that Congress
intended the substantive provisions of the Act to apply to states."
However, he found that the legislation failed to evidence a clear con-
gressional intent to authorize private suits against states in federal
court," since the jurisdictional section of the FLSA—undisturbed by
the 1966 amendments—provided only that employers who violated
the Act could be.sued "in any court of competent jurisdiction." 66 Be-
cause this jurisdictional section omitted reference either to state em-
ployers or to federal courts, 66 the Court concluded that Congress did
not intend to "condition the operation of [the state facilities covered
by the Act] on the forfeiture of immunity from suit in a federal
forum."67 Therefore, since the statute did not condition the state's
51 Fair Lalxn Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80
Stat.. 830 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) ). The Court had previously held that the 1966
amendments, as they applied to states, were a constitutional exercise of the congressional
commerce power. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-99 (1968), overruled by National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). The Court specifically reserved
consideration of the eleventh amendment question for a future case. 392 U.S. at 200.
The Wirtz decision was expressly overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 855 (1976), on the ground that the amendments unduly interfered with the
states' administration of essential governmental functions which had traditionally been
carried on by states. Id. at 852. See discussion of National League of Cities in text at notes
169-80 infra.
52 411 U.S. at 279.
63 Id. at 283. The majority of the Court in Employees did acknowledge, however,
that under the power conferred by the commerce clause, U.S. CoNs . r. art. 1, 8, el. 3,
Congress has the power to regulate the wages of employees of the state's nonprofit
facilities and consequently to place "new or even enormous fiscal burdens" on the states
when it does so. 411 U.S. at 284. This dictum was based on the Court's earlier decision in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), which had declared the substantive provisions
of the Act constitutional as they applied to states. There was thus no question that the Act was
binding upon the states.
54 411 U.S. at 285.
29 U.S.G. 216(6) (1970). This provision provided in part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of [this Act] shall be liable to the
... employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages or
their unpaid overtime compensation as the case may be, and in an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability
may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction . ,
66 in Pruden, the FELA specifically provided for suit in federal courts, although it
omitted any reference to states: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a dis-
trict court of the United States .... The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
... shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States." 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1970).
°T 411 U.S. at 285. However, Justice Douglas cryptically suggested that the em-
ployees might arguably be able to sue Missouri for back wages in state court. Id. at 287.
Justice Marshall argued that state courts have a constitutional obligation to entertain
suits brought by employees under the FLSA, even if' federal courts are barred from
hearing such suits by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in
result).. To the extent state courts are obliged to entertain such a suit, see id., this obser-
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participation in a regulated activity upon amenability to private fed-
eral suit, there could be no finding that the state waived its immunity
by operating its hospitals and schools." Consequently, the eleventh
amendment principle that a state may not be sued in federal court ab-
sent its consent," barred the federal court from hearing the suit."
The Court's narrow holding that an intent to subject states to
suit had not been shown in this situation introduced a new standard
into the implied waiver doctrine. The Court indicated that in order to
lift a state's immunity when a state engages in an activity subject to
congressional regulation, Congress must explicitly show its intention to
do so." Yet this result is in direct contrast with Parden, which had
found a sufficient. showing of congressional intent to authorize private
federal suits against' states implicit in a statute which nowhere men-
tioned states." It was therefore incumbent upon the Employees Court
to either overrule or distinguish Parden. Although the Court might
have overruled Parden and held that an implied waiver of immunity
will not be -found unless Congress explicitly conditions state participa-
tion in an activity upon amenability to private federal suit," the
vation presumably applies equally well to the state employees in Parden, thereby in-
validating the "right without a remedy" rationale used by the majority in that case. See
text at notes 44-45 supra.
68 See 911 U.S. at 284, 285. A close reading of the majority opinion reveals that
justice Douglas may have believed that under the commerce power Congress may di-
rectly lift the protection afforded states by the eleventh amendment, if it clearly shows
its intent to do so. See id. at 283 ("The question is whether Congress has brought the
States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity to suit in a federal court ...."); id.
at 285. This would explain his failure to acknowledge the voluntariness distinction
noted by justice Marshall in his concurring opinion. See note 76 iolra. The possibility
that under the commerce power Congress might directly lift a states eleventh amend-
ment immunity without the state's consent where the regulation concerns a state's essen-
tial governmental activities was clearly foreclosed by the Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). See text at notes 169-80 infra.
"411 U.S. at 284.
"Id. at 285. The Court's narrow holding that Congress had failed to show a suf-
ficiently clear intent to lift a state's immunity from suit in federal court could easily be
remedied by an amendment to the Act. Id. at 308.09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In 1974,
Congress amended the jurisdictional provision of the FLSA to provide: "Action to re-
cover such liability may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction ...." Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(d)(1), 88 Stat. 61 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. V, 1975)) (new language italicized). And to insure there could be no doubt, the
legislative history reads: "This amendment is intended to overcome that part of the de-
cision of the Supreme Court in [Employees] which stated that Congress had not explicitly
provided in enacting the 1966 amendments that newly covered state and local em-
ployees could bring an action against their employer in a Federal court under section
16." l-f.R. REP. No, 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2853.
This amendment and others were held unconstitutional in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) on tenth amendment grounds. See note 61
supra.
TI 411 U.S. at 285.
72 See text at note 46 supra.
73 The Court in Parden had found congressional intent to subject states to suit
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Employees Court did not find it necessary to do so.
C: The GovernmernallProprietary Distinction
Instead of overruling Parden, the Employees Court chose to dis-
tinguish the two cases on the basis of the nature of the state activity
involved in each case. According to the Court, the profit-making op-
eration of a "railroad business" by the state in Parden "was in the area
where private persons and corporations normally ran the
enterprise." 74 in Employees on the other hand, the non-profit opera-
tion of "[s]tate mental hospitals ... and training schools for delin-
quent girls" was characterized as nonproprietary." Thus the fact that
the state's activity could be characterized as nonproprietary or gov-
ernmental, apparently required the application of a stricter test to de-
termine whether or not Congress intended to subject states to private
federal suit." Because the Court distinguished, rather than overruled,
impticirin the statute. See text at note 46 supra.
74 411 U.S. at 284.
"Id. These activities, the Court emphasized, had been carried on by the states
for over one hundred years. Id. at 284 & n.2.
The invocation of the proprietary/nonproprietary distinction seems peculiar here.
in light of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which had upheld the constitutional-
ity of the substantive provisions of the FLSA governing the wages of certain state em-
ployees. Wirtz, although.specifically reserving consideration of the eleventh amendment
question, id. at 200, held that Congress, "when acting within a delegated power, may
override countervailing state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or
'proprietary' in character." Id. at 195. It would appear, then, that Justice Douglas, who
had dissented vigorously in Wirtz on the grounds that the tenth amendment and prin-
ciples of federalism protected state's from such intrusions upon their sovereignty, id. at
201-05, was here trying to reintroduce considerations of federalism in an area where
these considerations had been specifically rejected.
" The Court noted two other differences between Parden and Employees. The
first was that under the FLSA the employee would be allowed to "recover double
against a state," while in Parden, under the FELA, he or she would just be made whole.
411 U.S. at 286. See note 65 supra, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in
Employees, could not believe that "Congress in the pursuit of a harmonious federalism
desired to treat the States so harshly." Id. at 286. Justice Brennan dissenting, however,
pointed out that Congress had extended the coverage of the Act to state employees
"with full awareness that it was imposing a financial burden," Id. at 307 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, Brennan cited an earlier case which had held that the liqui-
dated damages provision of the ELSA "is not penal in nature but constitutes compensa-
tion" for damages too difficult to prove. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). Thus, contrary to the view
of the majority, the purpose of the statute was "as in Parden to make a state employee
whole." 411 U.S. at 306 (Brennan. J., dissenting), quoting the majority opinion, id. at
286. For these reasons, the double/single recovery distinction seems insignificant.
The second additional distinguishing feature noted by ihe Court was the fact that
in Pnrden, to preclude an injured employee from suing the state would result in a right
without a remedy, while in Employees, to deny state workers the right to sue their em-
ployer in federal court would not make the coverage of' the FLSA meaningless. Id. at
285-87. According to the provisions of the FLSA, the Secretary of Labor possesses au-
thority to institute suit against nonconforming employers to obtain restitution on behalf
of employees. Id. at 285-86. See 29 U.S.C. 216(c) (1970). Justice Douglas concluded
that the "policy of the Act so far as the States are concerned is wholly served by allow-
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Parden, it would seem to follow that an explicit indication of congres-
sional intent to authorize private federal suits against states will be re-
quired only where the state activity in question is a governmental
function. In contrast, where a state engages in a proprietary activity,
as in Parden, a sufficient intent to impose liability upon a state may be
inferred from the purposes of the regulatory statute, even if not ex-
plicitly indicated.
ing the delicate federal-state relationship to be managed through the Secretary of
Labor." 411 U.S. at 286. However, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, id. at 305,
and as justice Douglas himself seemed to acknowledge, id. at 287, the validity of this
distinction is open to ouestion. Due to a lack of staff and resources, the Secretary of
Labor has the ability to investigate only a fraction of the claims that might otherwise be
privately enforced. Id. at 305 n.5. Consequently, most state employees with valid claims
for wages under the FLSA would be left with a right to wages but without a remedy to
enforce that right. Id. at 305. Thus this distinction also seems insignificant.
The Tenth Circuit in Green considered a similar argument advanced by the plain-
tiff, namely that to uphold the state's eleventh amendment immunity would in effect
deny her a forum in which to prosecute her claim. 539 F.2d at 1274. The court of ap-
peals concluded, however, that "Mlle apparent hardships resulting from the adoption
[of the immunity doctrine) have long been subordinated." 539 F.2d at 1274, quoting
MacKethan v. Virginia, 370 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 508 F.2d 838, cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1045 (1975). The court of appeals further opined that "this subordination of
hardship seems acceptable when a governmental function is involved." 539 F.2d at
1274. By dismissing the•"right without a remedy" argument in this fashion, the Green
court, in effect, indicated its agreement with the view that the availability of an alterna-
tive remedy was not an important distinction between Employees and Parden. Because the
double recovery and alternative remedy distinctions just discussed seem insignificant,
the crucial distinction between Employees and Parden would seem to be the
governmentaVproprietary one. The Tenth Circuit's treatment of Employees and Parden
in its opinion in Green supports this view.
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Employees, noted another difference
between the two cases. In Parden it was possible to find a voluntary waiver since the
FELA had been in effect for 20 years when Alabama started its railroad. 411 U.S. at
296 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Employees, on the other hand, the state was already
operating the affected schools and hospitals at the time of the 1966 amendments and
therefore could not have voluntarily chosen to subject itself to federal court suits. Mar-
shall found this absence of free choice of crucial importance:
To suggest that the State had the choice of either ceasing operation
of these vital public services or "consenting" to federal suit suffices, I be-
lieve, to demonstrate that the State had no true choice at all and thereby
that the State did not voluntarily consent to the exercise of federal juris-
diction in this case.
Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring). Since a state may not be sued in federal court ab-
sent its consent, and since there was no consent here, Marshall concurred in affirming
the dismissal of the action. Id. at 296-97.
Although Justice Marshall agreed that the federal courts would be barred from
entertaining the suit under the eleventh amendment, in his view the state courts would
be able—and in fact, obligated—to entertain the suit. in his view, the eleventh amend-
ment confers no absolute immunity from suit, just immunity from suit in federal court.
When suit is brought against a state in state court the only immunity available to the
state would be its nonconstitutional sovereign immunity, which the states surrendered
to the national government insofar as they granted Congress power to regulate inter-
state commerce under the commerce clause. Therefore, a state court would be obligated
to assess damages against the state, even though a federal court could not. Id. at 297-98
(Marshall, J., concurring):
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D. Congressional Intent: A Prerequisite to Finding Waiver
The third Supreme Court decision providing the background
for Green's holding on the issue of implied consent is Edelman v.
Jordan." In Edelman, recipients of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled
(AABD) 78 funds sued Illinois officials seeking a retroactive award of
wrongfully withheld benefits. 7" The Court, in a 5-4 opinion, first
noted the general rule that "a suit by private parties seeking to impose
a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."" The Court then addressed
the question whether the state had impliedly waived its eleventh
amendment immunity by participating in a federal-state program sub-
ject to federal regulation. Parden and Employees were found inapplica-
ble to the situation in Edelman.' In those cases, the Court observed,
the question of waiver or implied consent turned "on whether Con-
gress had intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and
whether the State by its participation in the program authorized by
Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that
immunity."82 In Edelman, however, "the threshold fact of congres-
sional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally in-
cludes States was wholly absent."" Congress simply had not created a
cause of action against a state for a state's violation of federal AABD
regulations. 84 The Court held that absent this threshold fact, the mere
participation by a state in a federal-state public aid program is not
sufficient to establish consent to suit in federal courts." Consequently,
77 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
'See 42 U.S.C. VI 1381-1385 (1970) (amended 1972).
7E' 415 U.S. at 653, 656. Because of delays in processing applications and paying
funds to eligible recipients, plaintiff's had been denied money to which they were enti-
tled under federal regulations.
In addition to retroactive relief, the petitioners sought and obtained a permanent
injunction requiring Illinois officials to comply with the federal regulations. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the validity of the prospective relief'. Id. at 665. See note 86 infra.
" 415 U.S. at 663.
" Id. at 672.
" Id.
° id.
" hi. at 674. Even 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides for suits against per-
sons acting under color of state law who deprive any person of rights secured by fed-
eral law, was held not to indicate congressional intent to lift a state's eleventh amend-
ment immunity, since it was directed toward state officers rather than states. 415 U.S. at
674-77. See note 86 infra.
"' In other words. where Congress had not conditioned participation in the
AABD program upon amenability to suit, there could be no finding of implied
waiver, and the mere fact of participation in the federal-state program did not amount
to an express waiver of immunity. See note 34 supra. The Court also indicated that al-
though it had in past cases authorized suits between private parties in order to effec-
tuate a statutory purpose, it had never done so in the context of the eleventh amend-
tnent. 415 U.S. at 673-74.
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the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred plaintiffs' suit for
retroactive benefits."
Thus Edelman, like Employees, focused on whether Congress in:
tended to allow private suits against a state. Since Congress had
created no private cause of action at all to enforce AABD regulations,
there was no indication that Congress intended to condition a state's
participation in the federal-state program upon a waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity.
These three eases, Parden, Employees, and Edelman, provide the
Supreme Court's guidance to the lower courts regarding the question
of implied waiver under the eleventh amendment. Edelman made clear
that implied consent may only be found where Congress provides a
cause of action against a class of defendants which literally includes
states. Once this threshold requirement is met, the other two cases
taken together indicate that the nature of the state activity must be
examined. In Parden, where a state was engaged in a proprietary ac-
tivity, the Court found the requisite congressional intent implicit in the
purposes of the FELA. Thus in order to find an implied waiver in
Parden, it was unnecessary to show that Congress had even considered
that the Act might abrogate a state's constitutional immunity to suit. In
Employees, on the other hand, where historically governmental state ac-
tivities were involved, the Court held that only a clear showing by Con-
gress of intent to lift a state's immunity from suit would be sufficient
to justify a finding of waiver. It was not enough in Employees to show
that Congress clearly intended the Act to be binding upon the states;
rather an explicit showing that Congress intended to subject states to
private federal suit was required. Thus the Supreme Court apparently
indicated that two different standards of review exist for determining
whether an implied waiver of immunity may be found, depending
86
 415 U.S. at 678. The plaintiffs had been allowed, hovirver, to seek injunctive
relief to prevent the wrongful withholding of benefits in the future and the state did
not challenge the validity of the prospective relief on appeal. Id. at 656-58.
The apparently inconsistent result that allowed a private party to sue for pro-
spective relief but barred a suit for retroactive relief is the result of another fiction de-
veloped to avoid the harsh effect of the eleventh amendment. In a series of cases cul-
minating in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), the Court held that suits
against state officers are not necessarily suits against the state itself. These cases estab-
lished the principle that when a state officer acts contrary to the Constitution or laws of
the United States, he is stripped of his representative capacity and becomes suable as an
individual. Id. However, if the relief sought involves a monetary award to be paid from
the state treasury, the suit will he considered as one against the state and thus barred by
the eleventh amendment. Ford v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
to Edelman these two principles collided and the Court, in effect, held that the suit
against the officer, who by violating federal law was "stripped of his representative
capacity," was not a suit against the state when prospective relief was sought, but the
same suit did constitute a suit against the state when the order was to be applied re-
troactively, because it would result in the award of moneys from the state treasury.
Thus the suit for retroactive relief, being one against the state, was barred by the
eleventh amendment.
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upon whether the state activity is considered governmental or pro-
prietary.
II. IMPLIED WAIVER UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
A. Legislative Intent
As the Supreme Court decisions in Parden, Employees and
Edelman indicate, in order to find an implied waiver of immunity
under federal regulatory statutes, a congressional intent to allow pri-
vate federal suits against states must be shown. It is therefore neces-
sary when analyzing Green to examine the securities laws in order to
determine if this requisite congressional intent exists.
It is clear that the general antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts" apply to states when they issue securities. The definitional sec-
tions of both Acts define "person" to include "a government or politi-
cal subdivision thereof.""" The legislative history of the 1933 Act
shows that this definition was meant to include "every form of com-
mercial organization that might issue securities,"" including a "gov-
ernment or political subdivision.""" Although state issued securities
are exempt from the registration and disclosure requirements of the
1933 Act," they are specifically not exempt from the antifraud sec-
tion of that Act" and are also covered by the antifraud section of the
1934 Act." Substantively, the antifraud provisions of both Acts make
it unlawful for any person in connection with the offer or sale of any
securities to engage in any act, "practice, or course of business which
"7 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1970); id.	 78c(a)(9) (Stipp. V, 1975). Prior to June 4,
1975, the definition of person in the Exchange Act did not include governments or
political subdivisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1970).
" H.R. REP. NO. 85. 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
9" Id. See also Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 98-100 (1946) (construing a similar def-
inition of person as showing clear congressional intent to include states).
"' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2), 77f', 77j (1970).
"See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1970).
"' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(9), (10), 78j (1970 & Supp. V, 1975). See also S. REP. No.
75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45, rrloinled in [1975] U.S. Com:Cow. & Au. NEWS 221-23
(legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act). The senate report
stated in part: "The Committee is mindful of the historical relationship between the
federal securities laws and issuers of municipal securities. Apart from the general anti-
fraud provision, municipal securities are exempt from all substantive requirements." Id.
at 44. The report went on to note:
[A]lI documents and materials utilized in connection with the sale [of
municipal securities] would remain subject to the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act. The [proposed amendments to the Exchange Act
assure] that access of state and local governments to the capital markets
will not be regulated in ways not now permitted under the fraud provi-'
skins of the federal securities laws."
Id. at 45. This would seem to indicate a congressional understanding that the antifraud
provisions do apply to state issued securities.
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."" 4
It is therefore clear that states are to be bound by the substantive re-
quirements of the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions.
However, it seems doubtful that Congress intended to condition
a state's participation in the sale or distribution of securities upon
amenability to private federal suit. Missing from the Acts is any indi-
cation that Congress intended to authorize private suits to be brought
under the general antifraud sections." While some sections of the
1933 Act specifically authorize private suits for damages in connection
with a false registration statement," or misleading prospectus," the
antifraud provisions do not expressly create a civil remedy," There-
fore it would seem that Congress did not contemplate a civil remedy
for damages under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts."
Furthermore although the existence of an implied right to sue for
damages under the antifraud sections has since been well
established,'" the absence of the "threshold fact of congressional au-
" 15 U.S.C. 77q (1970). The antifraud provision of the 1933 Act provides in
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly —
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pur-
chaser.	 _
Id. Compare this language with that of rule 106-5, which is quoted at note 3 supra,
promulgated pursuant to the antifraud section of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
9 ' See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (there is no indica-
tion that Congress contemplated a civil remedy for violation of the antifraud provision
of the Exchange Act); Note, Implied Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 H ARV.
L. REV. 858, 860 (1948).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). States are not required to register their securities and
therefore are exempt from this section. Id. §§ 77c(a)(2), 771(1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). State securities are also exempt from this section. Id.
771(2) (1970). Another section makes liable persons who control persons liable under
sections 77k or 771. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970). See notes 102, 135 infra.
" See 15 U.S.C. ## 77q, 78j (1970).
" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Note, Implied Liabilities
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARy. L. REV. 858, 860-61 (1948).
'°° Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976), The Supreme Court
has interpreted the scope of the remedy available under the antifraud provision of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) in the light of other sections of the Act. See Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-211 (1976) (in light of the purposes and lan-
guage of other sections of the securities acts, the Court held that it is necessary to prove
scienter in order to recover damages under § 10b); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-36 (1975) (private damages under rule 10b-5 restricted to ac-
tual purchasers or sellers); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153,
155 (1972) (the amount of damages obtainable under lob is governed by § 28, 15
U.S.C. # 78bb(a)).
part:
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thorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States"
required by Edelman," would seem to preclude a finding of implied
waiver under these sections of the securities laws, when a state en-
gages in the sale or distribution of securities. 102
For a list of factors relevant to determining whether a private remedy is implicit
in a federal statute not expressly providing One, see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
1 °' 415 U.S. at 672. See text at notes 119-21 supra.
102 In Edelman, the Court refused to imply a private right of action for wrong-
fully denied benefits in spite of the fact that Congress clearly intended states to comply
with the federal regulations in connection with the administration of the AABD
program. See note 79 supra. It would seem that the same approach is mandated under
the securities laws, even though Congress probably intended that states not violate the
antifraud provisions when they issue securities. Even if the issuing of securities by a
state is considered to be a proprietary function, thereby causing the question of implied
waiver to be determined by Pardon's implicit intent test, the fact that Congress failed to
provide a cause of action against those who violate the antifraud section would seem to
prevent the courts from ever reaching the question of which test to apply. See note 85
supra. Of course, if the sale of securities by a state is considered to be governmental, see
note 164 infra, the failure of the Securities Acts to provide explicitly for private federal
suits against states would preclude a finding of implied waiver under the Employees test.
An argument may he made that the judicial recognition of an implied remedy
under the antifraud provisions, see note 100 supra — a judicial recognition absent in
Edelman — may provide a sufficient basis for distinguishing Edelman. Furthermore, to
the extent Congress has tacitly endorsed implied liabilities under the antifraud provi-
sions (Congress has nut changed the antifraud provisions during the thirty years in
which an implied remedy has been allowed by the courts. See Note, Implied Liabilities
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 858, 859-60 (1948) (implied liability
under the antifraud provisions first recognized in 1946)), it may be argued that the stat-
utes do, in effect, create a cause of action against "a class of defendants which literally
includes States." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672. Furthermore, if the sale of securities by a
state is considered to be a proprietary function, the extension of a well established im-
plied remedy to cover state defendants would seem to be clearly analogous to the ex-
tension of an express right to sue under the FELA in Parden. The fact that the anti-
fraud provisions do not create an express remedy may be balanced by the fact that un-
like the FELA in Parden, they specifically apply to states. Sec text at note 90 supra.
The potentially fatal weakness of this argument stems from the fact that the rem•
edy is nevertheless an implied one. While the Court has "authorized suits by one pri-
vate party against another in order to effectuate a statutory purpose, it has never done
so in the context of the Eleventh Amendment and a state defendant." Edelman, 415
U.S. at 673-74. Although the Court did not preclude the availability of equitable relief
in an eleventh amendment case, id. at 672 n.15, the likelihood that the Court would be
willing to extend the implicit intent. test of Parden to allow a private suit against a state
under the antifraud provisions is not strong. But see note 184 and accompanying text
infra.
A more in-depth analysis of the legislative history of the 1933 Act may be used to
support either side of the question of congressional intent. On the one hand, support
for the view that Congress could not have intended to allow private suits against states
may be found in the legislative history indicating Congress first considered and then re-
jected an effort to make states liable under the express liability provisions. Under the
House version of the bill, all persons who sold securities by means of a misleading
prospectus—"whether or not lthe securities were] exempted by section 3,"—were to be
liable to the purchaser for damages. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1933).
Under this version, states would have been expressly liable for deceptive language in an
official prospectus. However, the conference committee added a proviso to exclude se-
curities issued by states from the terms of the provision. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 26-27 (1933) (statement of the House Managers); Landis, The Legislative. History
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An even stronger argument can be made to show that in enact-
ing the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, Congress did not
intend to control a state's regulatory activities which affect the sec-
urities market. First, the legislative history of the Securities Act of
1933 indicates a desire by Congress to help states in their own regula-
of the Securities Act, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 46 (1959); 1 Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION
562 n.10 (1961). See 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1970). Thus Congress excepted state issued
securities from a provision creating express liability. Since in another context the Su-
preme Court has looked to legislative history to determine the reach of the implied lia-
bility sections of the Securities Acts, it would probably find this legislative history indica-
tive of a congressional purpose not to subject states to suit. c f. Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
On the other hand, a court predisposed to find a state liable under the antifraud
provisions could take a different view of the significance of this legislative history. First,
it should be noted that theoretically, where a state controls a private corporation which
violates section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970), the state will be
jointly and severally liable for the violation under section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970),
unless the state "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."
Id. See note 135 infra. Thus it is not clear that Congress intended to immunize states
from suit in all situations. Second, different sections of the Securities Acts carry with
them different standards of care. By exempting state securities from § 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77/(2) (1970), wherein in order to avoid liability for a misleading prospectus the seller
must show "that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, ..." Congress may have only intended to avoid
placing such a high standard of care upon states. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 200 (1976). In contrast, under the controlling persons section mentioned
above, it is only necessary to meet a more subjective test in order to avoid liability. 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1970). Therefore, where the antifraud provisions require a greater show-
ing of negligence or intentional conduct on the part of the defendant than under sec-
tion 12, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976) ("intent to de-
ceive, manipulate or defraud is required for civil liability under § lob and Rule 106-5
...."), Congress may nut have intended to exempt states from liability. Under this ap-
proach where the court can find greater negligence or intent than is required under
section 12, it could find a state liable under the antifraud provisions.
The Securities Acts also provide jurisdiction in the fecleYal courts to hear suits
brought under the Acts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (1970). Assuming that the antifraud
provisions may be read as providing a cause of action against those who violate their
terms (thus satisfying the Edelman requirement) it may be argued that because Congress
clearly intended the antifraud provisions of the Acts to protect purchasers of securities
issued ey states as well as those issued by other commercial organizations, see H.R. REP,
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 24 (1933), and because if denied the opportunity to sue
the state, the victims of a state's misrepresentation in connection with the offer or sale
of securities would have no other remedy, see note 76 supra, under the Parden test, any
state which engaged in the sale or distribution of securities would impliedly waive its
eleventh amendment immunity to a suit brought under the antifraud provisions. See
discussion in text supra at notes 90-46.
The more puzzling question, however, is whether the test in Parden may be used
in such a situation. The answer would probably depend upon which view of the distinc-
tions between Parden and Employees is adopted. As discussed below, see note 136 infra,
the Second Circuit in Forman relied upon the fact that the state voluntarily entered the
field regulated by Congress in deciding that the Parden test should be applied. On the
other hand, if the governmental/proprietary distinction is used, it is likely that a court
would find that the Employees standard would be controlling. See note 1.64 and accom-
panying text infra.
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tion of securities.'" 3 For example, the House report on the Act states:
This bill carefully preserves the jurisdiction of State security
commissions to regulate transactions within their own bor-
ders. It goes further and makes that control more effective
by preventing evasion of State security legislation by the
device of selling in interstate or foreign commerce from
outside the State.
The bill	 also makes it unlawful to use the instru-
tnents of interstate or foreign commerce in an effort to
evade protective state legislation.'"
Thus Congress clearly indicated a desire to help states to enforce their
own securities laws. Second, section 18 of the Act provides that
"ft-floating in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the se-
curities commission (or any agency or office performing like func-
tions) of any State ... over any security or any person."'" This would
seem to indicate a congressional purpose not to interfere with a state's
ability to regulate securities within its borders. Finally, the antifraud
sections address only misrepresentations made in the offer or sale,"° 6 or
"in connection with the purchase or sale"'" of any security and hence
would not seem to embrace activities of a regulatory nature.'" Due to the
deference shown by Congress toward the ability of states to regulate
securities and the conspicuous absence of any indication that Congress
intended the antifraud provisions of the Acts to apply to a state's exercise
of a regulatory function, it would seem to follow that Congress did not
intend the antifraud sections of the securities laws to apply to a state's
regulation of securities. Of' course, if the substantive requirements of the
antifraud provisions do not apply to state's regulatory activities, there can
be no basis for finding an implied waiver of immunity when a state
engages in regulatory activities. 1 °"
1 " Until 1975, the 1934 Act did not include states within its definition of person.
Thus the antifraud provision of that Act literally did not apply to states. See note 88
supra, 151 infra. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1970) (amended by Securities Acts Amendmenu
of 1975, Pub. L. 94.29, § 3(2), 89 Stat. 97).
114
 H..R. Rn. No, 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1933).
' 115 SecuritiCS Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970).
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
I " 15 U.S.C. § 78,j (1970).
1 " While an argument could be made that the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale" in the antifraud section of the 1934 Act is broad enough to include a
state's regulatory activities, the history of the statute indicates that this argument will
not withstand scrutiny. First, as mentioned previously, see note 88 supra, as originally
enacted the antifraud section of the 1934 Act did not apply to states at all. Secondly,
there is no indication in the legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange
Act that Congress contemplated the regulation of a state's regulatory activities under
the antifraud section. See S. Rn'. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in [1975) U.S.
Coat: Con:. & Au. NEws 179. This history therefore 'would not support a finding of
congressional intent in the antifraud section of the 1934 Act. to regulate a state's reg-
ulatory activities. See Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333, 336 (fith Cir. 1975).
"IP Since the regulation of a state's financial institutions is a governmental func-
tion, see text at note 157 infra, the explicit intent test of'Employees would apply. See text
at note 76 supra. 823
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B. Case Law Addressing the Waiver Question Under the Securities Acts
As the Court of Appeals in Green noted, three circuit court opin-
ions have applied the implied waiver doctrine enumerated in Parden,
Employees and Edelman, in the context of suits brought against states
seeking damages under the securities laws.'" Two of the decisions
upheld the states' claims of immunity, but the remaining one, upon
which the plaintiff in Green placed primary reliance, found an implied
waiver of immunity by the state.
1. State Involvement in a Regulatory Capacity
In the first of these circuit court cases, Brown v. Kentucky,"' the
plaintiff brought suit against the state of Kentucky to recover money
damages for alleged violations of the securities laws by the Commis-
sioner of Banking and Securities and certain loan examiners." 2 The
suit charged gross neglect by the state officials for failing to discover
and report "many improper and illegal acts and omissions"" 3 of a
building and loan association. The Kentucky statutes, similar to ones
in Utah, 114 required the Commissioner annually to "make a thorough
examination into the condition, workings and affairs of the
association,"" 5 and to "report any violation of law or any unauthorized
or unfit practices ... "MI of the company. The complaint further al-
leged that one of the examiners employed by the banking department
had improperly received payments from the company in violation of a
Kentucky statute.'" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per
curiam opinion, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action on
eleventh amendment grounds. The court noted: "In this case, plain-
tiff has sought money damages from the Commonwealth itself. No in-
junctive or merely prospective relief has been sought. This, we think,
is the clearest type of case in which the Eleventh Amendment bar ...
protects the state."" 8 Therefore, the question to be decided was
whether the state, through its involvement in an area already regu-
lated by Congress, had thereby impliedly waived its immunity from
suit.
In addressing the waiver issue, the court of appeals first ob-
served that the question of waiver turns on whether Congress in-
"" 539 F.2d at 1272, 1273.
" 1 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
"'Id. at 334-35. Plaintiff alleged violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C, § 77(q) (1970), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), and rule 106-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1976). See notes 3, 93
supra.
73 513 F.2d at 335.
14 See note 12 supra.
75 KT. REV. Srxr. § 289.710(1) (1970).
"6 Ky. REV. STAT. § 289.710(2) (1970).
1 " 513 F.2d at 335. See KY. REV. STAT. § 289.690 (1970).
"g 513 F.2d at 336. See note 122 infra.
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tended to abrogate a state's immunity from suit.'" After examining
the Securities Acts, the Sixth Circuit. Found no evidence that Congress
intended "to divest the state of its power t.o regulate its state chartered
institutions" or to condition such regulation upon consent to private
federal suit.'" The court of appeals emphasized that "the statutory
duty imposed upon the [Commissioner] cannot in any way be con-
strued as the exercise of a proprietary ffinction, but is rather clearly
the exercise of a regulatory function ... which has been historically
exercised as part of [the state's] governmental powers."'" Apparently
it was the fact that a governmental function was involved that led the
court to apply the clear intent test of Employees.'" The court found
that the Securities Acts failed to evidence this requisite clarity of in-
tent to subject a state's exercise of a regulatory function to private
federal suit.' 2" Thus, in a fact situation similar to that in Green, the
Sixth Circuit held that the eleventh amendment barred the suit, de-
spite plaintiff's contention that by "interposing itself completely in the
affairs of [the company, the state] waived its immunity to suit."' 24
The Sixth Circuit subsequently confronted facts nearly identical
to those in Brown in Yeomans v. Kentucky.'" In Yeomans, plaintiffs
charged that the states of Kentucky and Ohio "went beyond their
regulatory functions and became aiders and abettors or participants in
the fraudulent activities [of a consumer loan agency] which resulted in
widespread losses to the investors. "126 The Sixth Circuit, again in a
per curiam opinion and citing Brown, held that Idegarciless of what
the specific allegations may be, the complained of activities of the de-
fendant states arose out of the immunity clothed function of govern-
mental regulation of securities,"' 27
 and affirmed dismissal of the ac-
tion. 128 Both Brown and Yeomans, then, indicate that. in regard to the
governmental function of regulating state chartered financial institu-
1 " 513 F.2d at 336, quoting Edelman, 4 15 U.S. at 672.
"" 513 F.2d at 336.
"'Id.
122
 On the other hand, it is possible that the Sixth Circuit read Employees and
Edelman as effectively replacing the standard set forth in Parden: i.e. under this view, in
all future cases where an implied waiver is alleged—regardless of whether ihe state's
activity is considered governmental or proprietary—a waiver will be found only where
the language of the federal statute "leave[s] no room for any other reasonable construc-
tion' other than that Congress intended to lift a state's eleventh amendment immunity.
See id., quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213
U.S. 151, 171 (1909). The Sixth Circuit seemed to quote Edelman out of context, how-
ever, since in Edelman the Court was addressing the standard by which an express
waiver of immunity by a state will be found, see note 34 supra, rather than the standard
by which congressional intent to subject states to private suit will be measured. See Edel -
man, 415 U.S. at 673-74.
"3 513 F.2d at 336.
"'id.
126 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1975).
mid. at 994.
"t Id, at 995.
1 " Id.
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tions, Congress failed to show clearly in the securities laws an intent to
subject states to private suit.
2. State Involvement in a Commercial Capacity
These cases decided by the Sixth Circuit would have ended the
Tenth Circuit's inquiry into the waiver issue had not plaintiff alleged
that Forman v. Community Services, Inc. 129 was controlling. In Forman, a
different situation than those in Brown and Yeomans faced the Second
Circuit. In that case, tenants of a state financed housing project
brought suit against the New York Housing Finance Agency (HFA)
and the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal (DHCR) for alleged violations of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts.' 3" In contrast to Brown and
Yeomans, the involvement of the state in Forman was not part of a state
program to regulate securities. On the contrary, in Forman the state
was directly involved in the corporation which issued the alleged
securities' 31
 in both a financial and managerial capacity.'" The state
had provided significant financing for the housing project, and
through the DHCR Commissioner, had provided "supervision of the
development, construction, promotion and operation of the
project."' 33 The state was thus directly involved in the securities area
in a commercial rather than a regulatory capacity.
In addressing the eleventh amendment issue, the Second Circuit
found that the state had impliedly "waived its sovereign immunity
with respect to federal securities laws violations by voluntarily entering
a field under federal regulation."'" The court of appeals also found
that Congress had "conditioned the right to be involved in the sale
" 9 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"0 1d. at 1248-49. Plaintiff alleged violations of § 17(a) of th-e Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and of § 106 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970), and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5
(1976). The gravamen of the complaint concerned misrepresentations in an "Informa-
tion Bulletin" distributed by the general contractor. One of the alleged misrepresenta-
tions was that the total cost would be $258,678,000 with the risk of completing the proj-
ect within that price on the contractors. However, it later turned out that the HFA
agreed to a final bill nearly 30% higher or $340,500,000, which increase substantially
raised the cost to prospective tenants of both their shares of stock and their monthly
rent. 500 F.2d at 1250.
"' The primary question on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the
shares in the cooperative housing corporation purchased by all tenants of the project
were securities within the meaning of the federal securities acts. The Second Circuit
held they were, but the Supreme Court disagreed, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975). See Note,
Securities Regulation-Shares of Nonprofit Cooperative Housing Developments as Securities, 17
B.C. IND. & Com, L. REV. 287 (1976). Because this disposition of the primary question
settled the matter, the Supreme Court did not reach the eleventh amendment issues.
421 U.S. at 846 n.11. See note 137 infra.
'" 500 F.2d at 1249.
'" Id.
" 4 Id. at 1256.
826
NOTES
and distribution of securities upon amenability to suit in federal court
....""5
 Since the federal regulatory system was in effect at the time
the state became involved in the securities field, the court held that
the state waived its immunity by becoming so involved. 130
 Thus where
the state was involved in the securities area in a commercial capacity,
the Second Circuit found that the state had impliedly waived its im-
munity under the securities laws on the basis of the implicit intent test
in Parden.' 37
3.	 The Green Court's Analysis
Due to the 'p roprietary  nature of the state's activity in Forman,
however, the Tenth Circuit found that case to be factually distin-
"5 1d. The problem with this approach lies in the fact that the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws do not expressly create a cause or action against violators of
their terms. See text at notes 95-102 supra. However, there is a theory, relying strictly
upon the literal language of other provisiotis of the 1933 Act which might avoid the
difficulties just mentioned. Under section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970),
"(e)very person who ... controls any person liable under sections [11 or 12 of the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77k, 771 (1970)) shall also be liable ... to any person to whom such con-
trolled person is liable ...." Since §15 does not exempt states, it would seem that a
state may be held liable where it controls someone liable under sections 11 or 12.
Under the state statutory scheme in Forman, the state is responsible for the supervision
of the development and construction of the housing project by the general contractors.
Forman, 500 F.2d at 1299. Assuming the informational bulletin issued by the general
contractor.qualifies as a prospectus, see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970), the general contrac-
tor could be held liable under the express terms of § 11 for misleading information in
the prospectus.(lt is important that the shares of stock are privately issued, as § II ex-
empts securities issued by states from its terms.) Under this approach, the state would
also be liable by virtue of § 15, and "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to
sue a class of defendants which literally includes States" required in Edelman would be
present.
16
 5(}0 F.2d at 1256 n.13. The Second Circuit relied solely on Parden, finding
that the explicit intent test of Employees did not apply. N. In its view, the crucial differ-
ence between Parden and Employees stemmed from the question of voluntariness. See
note 76 supra. The Second Circuit explained that in Employees,
the state's activity came first, the federal regulation second. In this posture,
the (Supreme) Court held, the stale could not be found to have waived its
immunity; rather Congress would be required explicitly to override it.
Here and in Parden, however, the regulatory system was in effect before
the state entered the field. That entry into the regulated field thus consti-
tuted a waiver of the state's immunity.
Id. Thus the Second Circuit relied on Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Employees
for this distinction, see note 76 supra, rather than on the governmental/proprietary dis-
tinction put forth by the majority.
An argument could be made however, that the construction of the housing proj-
ects in Forman and the issuance of the shares of stock in the projects to tenants were
proprietary activities and that therefore the Parden test of congressional intent was ap-
propriate. See also note 164 infra.
"T 500 F.2d at 1256. After Forman was reversed by the Supreme Court on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), see note 131 supra, the Second Circuit indicated its view
that the implied waiver holding in that case remains unaffected by the Supreme Court's
action. Morrell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 263 (1976). Therefore, the
Second Circuit's finding of an implied waiver under the Securities Laws when a state
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guishable from the situation in Green.'" In Forman, the court of ap-
peals noted, where the "state of New York was not merely involved in
a regulatory capacity""" but was directly involved in the development,
construction, promotion and operation of the housing project,' 4 " the
fact situation was indeed much closer to that in Parden.' 4 ' In Forman,
the state was directly involved in the actual sale and distribution of the
alleged securities.' 42 In contrast to the Forman situation, the states in
Green and the Sixth Circuit cases, were not involved in the actual sel-
ling and distribution of securities, "except to the extent [their] laws al-
lowed [certain companies" to issue securities."'" Rather, these states
were involved in the securities market solely in a regulatory capacity.
Because of these factual differences, the Green court concluded that
Farman was inapplicable to the present case. "144
After disposing of Forman, the court of appeals announced that
it preferred to follow the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit cases.'" As
the Sixth Circuit cases had indicated, because the regulation by a state
of its own state chartered financial institutions is clearly a governmen-
tal function,'" the explicit intent test of Employees governed the reso-
participates in the actual sale and distribution of securities would seem to have strong
precedential value. But the Second Circuit has still not dealt with the Edelman problem
discussed supra in note 102 and accompanying text.
"a The Tenth Circuit did not characterize New York's participation in the sale
and distribution of securities as proprietary; it only asserted that Forman presented a
situation closer to Parden than did Green, Brown or Yeomans. 539 F.2d at 1273. However,
the court of appeals did distinguish Green from Forman on the grounds that Green
inVolved a clearly governmental activity and hence was closer to the situation in
Employees. Because the court appeared to base its findings of factual proximity to the
situations in Parden or Employees upon the governmental nature of the activites involved
in each case, it seems fair to say that the governmental/proprietary distinction formed
the basis for the Tenth Circuit's distinction of Forman.
ISO 539 F.2d at 1273.
14 ° Id., quoting FOrman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.), rev'd, sub nom. United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Involvement in the sale and distribution of
securities is arguably analogous to the proprietary operation of a railroad. However, if
the governmental/proprietary distinction is used as the basis of deciding whether to
apply the test of Employees or Pruden, it becomes harder to argue that the state's in-
volvement in Forman is less governmental than Missouri's operation of mental hospitals
and schools for the disabled in Employees. The state was not seeking a profit in either
case. Would it be considered significant that New York was involved in the develop-
ment of housing for only 20 years, while the historical operation by states of mental
hospitals extended back over 60 years? Could one state's activities be considered more
or less traditionally governmental than the other? Perhaps it was doubts about these
questions which led the Second Circuit to rely on the voluntariness issue rather than the
governmental/proprietary distinction. See note 136 supra. See also note 164 infra.
" 1 539 F.2d at 1273.
"z See id. See note 131 SU rPa.
140 539 F.2d at 1273.
" 4 Id.
' 45 1d.
148 See text at note 157 infra.
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!talon of the eleventh amendment issue in Green.'" Furthermore, as
Employees had taught, in order to find an implied waiver where the
state is engaged in a governmental activity, it is first necessary to show
that Congress clearly intended to condition a state's participation in
the activity upon amenability to suit. in federal court."" Consequently,
the Tenth Circuit sought but did not find a clear showing that Con-
gress, in enacting the securities laws, intended to subject a state to pri-
vate suit when it engages in a regulatory activity.'" Applying the ex-
plicit intent test of Employees, the Green court declared that the mere
fact that one section of the securities laws defines "person" as includ-
ing a government or political subdivision "does not present the type
of indication needed to establish a [clear] congressional intent to lift [a
state's] Eleventh Amendment immunity." 150 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit found nothing in any other applicable section of the Securities
Acts that revealed "an intention on Congress' part to remove the
state's immunity whets it engages in regulating state chartered agen-
cies or to condition Utah's operation of that function upon consent to
suit in a federal forum when securities are involved in that regulatory
function."''' Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded "the absence
"7 539 F.2d at 1274. The Tenth Circuit thus distinguished Forman from
Employees on the basis of the governmental/proprietary distinction, rather than on the
basis of the voluntariness distinction upon which the Second Circuit relied. See note
136 supra.
"9 Under the Employees explicit intent test, the mere showing that Utah had en-
tered a field subject to federal regulation was insufficient to support a finding of im-
plied waiver. See note 102 supra.
1"9 539 F.2d at 1273-74.
150 Id.
131 Id. at 1274. As previously rioted, the antifraud provisions would seem only to
apply to states when they engage in the purchase or sate of securities. See text at notes
91-94 supra. Plaintiffs theory that the antifraud provisions apply where a state acts in a
regulatory capacity is supported by neither the language of the statutes, nor their legis-
lative history. See text at notes 103-109 supra. After suit was filed but before the Tenth
Circuit rendered its opinion in Green, Congress amended the definition of person in the
1934 Act so that it now includes governments and political subdivisions thereof'. 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (Supp. V, 1975). Neither the parties nor the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged this development. However, even if the Tenth Circuit had considered the new
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it surely would have reached the
same result. The change in the definition of person was one small part of a com-
prehensive amendment to the Act designed to facilitate the creation of a national mar-
ket system for securities. See 15 U.S.C. 6 78b (Supp. V, 1975). There is no indication in
the legislative history of the 1975 amendments that Congress intended to subject a state
to private federal suit for activities arising out of the state's regulation of securities. See
S. REP, No, 75, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 1, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Coot; CONG. Sc An. NEWS
179. Since the original act clearly exempted states from the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act, see note 88 supra, and since there is no indication in the legislative history
that Congress intended to change the status of the states' immunity from suit when they
regulate securities, congressional intent to subject states to private suit for regulatory ac-
tivities would seem to be lacking. Consequently, under the Employees test the mere fact
that the definition of person in the 1934 Act now includes governments and political
subdivisions would not constitute a sufficient indication of congressional intent to lift a
state's immunity from suit when it engages in the regulation of securities.
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of that congressional intent resolves the Eleventh Amendment ques-
tion at an early stage and prevents inquiry into conduct by the state
which might constitute consent."'" Hence, the Tenth Circuit held
that the eleventh amendment afforded Utah and its Commissioner of
Financial Institutions immunity from the plaintiff's private federal suit
for monetary compensation under the securities laws.
In light of the examination of the securities law undertaken
previously,' 53 it seems that the court of appeals in Green correctly per-
ceived that under the strict Employees test, the requisite threshold fact
of Congressional intent to allow private federal suit against a state for
acts arising out of its regulation of securities was lacking. Unfortu-
nately for the plaintiff, under this test, the mere showing that the
state had entered a field subject to considerable federal regulation, was
insufficient to support a finding of implied waiver.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE GOVERNMENTAIJPROPRIETARY
DISTINCTION
Still to be determined is which state activities are "governmental"
and which "proprietary." Because the availability of monetary relief
under protective federal statutes may turn upon the classification of
the state's activity in a given case,'" it is important to know what fac-
tors are important in determining whether the activity will be deemed
governmental or proprietary. This section of the note will examine
the governmental/proprietary distinction more closely, and focus upon
potential difficulties in applying the distinction. In addition, the fu-
ture role of the distinction in eleventh amendment cases will be ex-
plored in the light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery,' 55
 which invalidated the extension of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to state em-
ployees on grounds that it impermissibly infringed upon traditional
state functions.
A. Practii:al Considerations
—Problems of Classification
In the cases considered thus far which utilized the
The legislative history or the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act do make it
clear that materials issued by states in connection with the sale of government issued
securities "would remain subject to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act." S.
REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws
223.
152 539 F.2d at 1274.
153
 See text at notes 87-109 supra.
15 ' This would be true for all federal statutes authorizing suit For monetary dam-
ages passed pursuant to the commerce power, such as the FELA in Parden. However,
the question whether the state's activity is governmental or proprietary would not be
significant where the statute authorizing monetary compensation was adopted' under
Congress' spending power or pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See
note 178 infra.
153
 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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governmental/proprietary distinction, the task of classifying a state's
activity as governmental or proprietary was not difficult. In Employees,
two factors were found relevant in classifying the operation of schools
and hospitals as nonproprietary. First, the institutions were not oper-
ated for profit; second, they did not represent activities normally en-
gaged in by private persons and corporations."° Similarly, since the
regulatory activities of the states in Green, Brown and Yeomans had
historically been exercised by the states' 57 —presumably on a non-
profit basis—they too could be classified as governmental. On the
other hand, the operation of the railroad in Parden which was both
profit-making and an activity normally engaged in by private persons,
was considered by the Court to be proprietary.'"
In future cases, however, it will not always be clear which State-
run activities are governmental and which are proprietary. If both the
profit/nonprofit distinction and the question whether private persons
normally engage in the activity are to be considered in any given situa-
tion, problems of classification will inevitably arise when a state activ-
ity, such as operating a railroad, is normally carried on by private per-
sons, but is not operated for profit by the state; or contrarily, when a
state runs a uniquely governmental enterprise, such as a toll highway,
but for profit.
The problem of classification may be conceptually simplified by
eliminating the profit/nonprofit distinction. First, it seems quite clear
that the result in Parden would have been the same even if Alabama
had operated its railroad on a nonprofit basis. Indeed, in United States
v. California,' cited with approval in Parden, the argument that a
federal act should not apply to a state run railroad on the grounds
that it was not operated for profit was rejected by the Supreme
Court.'" Furthermore, the Court in Parden was influenced by the
purpose of the FELA to provide compensation for all railway workers
injured in the course of their employment.'"' Since the Court was
unwilling to conclude that Congress intended to exclude a group of
employees from the coverage of the Act merely because their em-
ployer "hippen[ed] to be state owned,"" 2 it is unlikely the Court would
have denied the protection of the Act to employees whose employer
happened to be state owned and nonprofit. Thus it seems clear that
Parden would have held the FELA applicable to non-profit state-run
railroads. Secondly, in Employees, where the crucial factor was held to
," 411 U.S. at 284.
157 See Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F,2d at 336.
'" See Employees, 411 U.S. at 284.
MI 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
"" Id. at 183, 185. For a discussion of the probable future significance of United
States v. California, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-58 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n,18 (1976)
(majority opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
1 "' 377 U.S. at 189.90.
162 Id at 190.
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be absence of clear congressional intent, Congress had clearly shown
its intent to include state hospitals and schools within the provisions of
the FLSA even where operated for profit.' 63
 It seems highly unlikely
that the Court in Employees would have decided the case differently if
all or some of the schools had been operated for profit. Therefore it
is submitted that the profit/not-for-profit distinction is of little weight
in determining whether a state's activity is governmental or proprie-
tary.
The criterion of whether or not private individuals normally run
the enterprise also poses difficulties. First, classification problems
would arise where both governments and private persons normally
engage in the activity. Selling securities"'; or operating colleges, li-
braries or recreational facilities are examples of such activities, all of
which Congress may regulate under the commerce power. Secondly,
times change: activities once normally engaged in by private parties
may now be run by the government and vice-versa. Gambling
operations,'" and the construction of low cost housing," 6 are such
examples. The Court's opinion in Employees constitutes inadequate
guidance for the judicial resolution of these classification problems in
the future. Hence classification of states' activities in these gray areas
"3 See 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(1) (1970),
304 The problem of classifying the activity of selling securities by a state illustrates
the inadequacy of the governmental/proprietary distinction. Other considerations sug-
gest, however, that the sale of securities by a state should be classified as a governmen-
tal activity. For example, in Parden the operation of the Terminal Railway was a "rather
isolated activity." Employees, 411 U.S. at 285. Furthermore, the history of litigation
under federal railroad statutes had indicated that state owned railroads stand on the
same footing as private railroads. See note 41 supra. On the other hand the issuance of
securities by states is not an isolated state activity, but is an activity traditionally engaged
in by states and political subdivisions thereof. Furthermore, implicit in the notion that
some state activities should be considered proprietary is the conviction that these ac-
tivities merit the same treatment when engaged in by states or private persons. It is
clear from a reading of the Securities Acts, that Congress believed that states and state
issued securities deserve special treatment, see text at note 91 supra, and the mere fact
that Congress has recognized that state issuers of securities merit different treatment
than private issuers may justify the application of Employees stricter test. That is, once
Congress has recognized that an activity deserves different treatment when engaged in
by a state, it would seem to be appropriate to require Congress to explicitly show its in-
tent to lift a state's eleventh amendment immunity. For these reasons, the offer and sale
of securities by a state should be considered a governmental function.
"5 New Hampshire established the twentieth century's first state operated lottery
in 1964. 1963 N.H. Laws 52:1 (current version at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 284:21-a -
21-n (1966 Replacement Volume) ). As of 1975, twelve other states had followed suit.
COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL. POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING. FIRST INTERIM
REPORT 13, 20 (1975).
146
 In 1960, New York created the first state housing Finance agency to provide
supervision and financing for the development of low cost housing. 1960 N.Y. Laws ch.
671, current version at N.Y. PRIV. HOUSING FIN. LAW, art, 3, § 41 (McKinney 1962). As
of 1973 at least twenty nine other states had created similar agencies. Development of
State Housing Finance Agencies, 9 REAL. PROP., PROB. & TR. j. 471, 471 (1974); Pearlman,
State Housing Finance Agencies and the Myth of Low Income Housing, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
649, 649 (1974).
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will have to be "marked out on a case by case basis."'"
B. Significance of the Distinction after National League of Cities
A 1976 Supreme Court decision, which addressed the
governmental/proprietary distinction in a case involving the doctrine
of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment,'"" may reduce the
number of cases presenting the problems of classification outlined
above. In National League of Cities v. Usety' 6" several states challenged
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act' 7" which ex-
tended the Act's minimum wage and overtime requirements to virtu-
ally all state employees."' The Court, bringing to an abrupt halt the
trend of decisions finding the congressional power under the com-
merce clause vis -a-vis the states practically limitless, 172 found that by
virtue of the policy of constitutional federalism embodied in the tenth
amendment, the Act impermissibly interfered with the states' ability
to make choices in areas essential to the administration of public law
and the furnishing of public services."" The Court held that under
the commerce power, Congress may not significantly interfere with
"States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships" in ac-
tivities traditionally engaged in by state and local governments.' 74
In so holding, the National League of Cities Court expressly re-
jected the reasoning in Maryland v. Wirtz, 15 which upheld as constitu-
tional the 1966 amendments to the FLSA' 76 on the grounds that
107 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
Cow', amend. X.
"" 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Note, The Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty as a Funda-
mental Tenet of Constitutional Federalism, 18 B.C. IND, Sc Com. L. Rrv. 736 (1977).
17 " Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
58-60 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
171 426 U.S. at 836.
' 2 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968). ("['The Federal Government,
when acting within a delegated power, • may override countervailing state interests
whether these be described as 'govermnentaf or 'proprietary' in character."), overruled by
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
The National League of Cities Court also disapproved the following dicta from
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936):
(We) look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as
marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power.
But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate com-
merce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been au-
thorized by Congress than can an individual.
426 U.S. at 854-55.
"2 426 U.S. at 851.
1 " Id, The majority termed this ability the "States' power to determine the wages
which shall be paid to those whom they employ ...." Id. at 845. Justice Stevens in dis-
sent found no such "inherent right to pay a substandard wage ...." Id. at 880 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
1 " 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
176 These were the very amendments at issue in Employees. See text at notes
59-6 I , supra.
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under the commerce clause Congress "may override countervailing
state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'pro-
prietary' . . "177 Since it is now clear after National League of Cities, that
congressional regulation of wages and hours of employees of state
hospitals and schools is impermissible, it is equally clear that no cause
of action may be created against a state under the FLSA where the
state engages in a traditionally governmental activity. Thus, where the
tenth amendment prohibits the regulation, no cause of action may be
created under which eleventh amendment issues would arise.'"
.	 '" 392 U.S. at 195.
'TH It should be noted that the Court in National League of Cities directed its hold-
ing to the limitation of congressional power to interfere with states' governmental func-
tions under the commerce clause. The Court specific-ally suggested, however, that
under either the spendin4 power, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, Congress might interfere with states' traditional governmental functions.
See 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. Thus, for example, under the spending power Congress could
condition a state's participation in a federally subsidized project, such as the Aid to the
Aged, Blind and Disabled program in Edelman, upon a waiver of immunity to suit with-
out exceeding the limitation imposed by the tenth amendment. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at
672-74 (implying that if Congress had shown a clear intent to create a private federal
cause of action against a state in connection with the federally subsidized AABD
program, an implied waiver of immunity might have been found). It is submitted that
the underlying rationale for such a result is that a state's participation in a federally
funded program would be voluntary and therefore the state would have impliedly con-
sented to conditions attached to participation. Similarly, and as the Court held in Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), one month after National League of Cities,
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress may regulate a state's govern-
mental activities to the extent the state unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and even provide private federal suits for
damages against a state when it does so. At issue in Fitzpatrick, were recent amendments
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, authorizing private federal suits for mone-
tary damages against a state found to have discriminated on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex or national origin in its employment practices. Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Act of 1972, Pub. I.. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970) ). The Court found that in this case, "the 'threshold fact of congressional au-
thorization' ... to sue the State" which was absent in Edelman, was here clearly present.
427 U.S. at 452, quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672. Because the fourteenth amendment is
specifically directed toward states, the Court held that "the Eleventh Amendment, and
the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of * 5 of [that] amendment." 427 U.S. at 456.
Thus, under the fourteenth amendment Congress may directly lift a state's
eleventh amendment immunity, even where the state is already engaged in the activity
at the time of the federal legislation. In Fitzpatrick, Congress provided for private fed-
eral suit against a state for discrimination in connection with employment, even where
the state could not have voluntary chosen to withdraw from the activity. However this
does not mean that an exception has been created to the rule that a state may be sued
without its consent. Strictly speaking, although the fourteenth amendment does not
specifically so provide, it is fair to construe the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
by the states as a waiver of immunity to suits authorized by Congress to facilitate the
enforcement of the amendment's substantive provisions against the states. Because the
fourteenth amendment was adopted after the eleventh amendment, and because its
provisions are directed specifically toward state conduct, the power given to enforce its
provisions differ from the other powers of congress vis-a-vis the eleventh amendment.
Due to the time factor, the eleventh amendment clearly limits congressional power
stemming from earlier provisions, such as the commerce clause, but does not necessarily
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Therefore, when Congress acts under the commerce power and pro-
vides for private federal suit against a state, the threshold question
will be whether the congressional regulation "curtail[s] in any sub-
stantial manner the exercise of [the state's] powers,"'" or substantially
"interfere[s] with traditional aspects of state sovereignty ...." 1 "
Where the federal regulation is found to be invalid under this
threshold test, the case will be disposed of before reaching the implied
waiver issue under eleventh amendment. Thus the National League of
Cities test will effectively weed out a substantial number of cases which
otherwise would have been decided upon the basis of the
governmental/proprietary distinction as set forth in Employees and
Parden. Where, however, the federal regulation was not passed pur-
suant to the commerce clause, or does not impermissibly interfere
with a state's decision-making abilities, or affects an area not tradi-
tionally considered essential to the state's governmental function,
the policies of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment would
not invalidate the regulation and the eleventh amendment issues dis-
cussed above will be reached.
C. Considerations of Federalism and the Securities Laws.
It is apparent that under this approach, in those cases where an
individual sues a state pursuant to federal regulation, and where the
state is engaging in a traditionally governmental activity, the regula-
tion may be held invalid under the tenth amendment policy an-
nounced in National League ql Cities, even if it is clear that Congress in-
tended the state to be bound by the federal regulatory statute.'"
Under the test applied in National League of Cities, the crucial question
concerns the impact of the legislation upon a state's ability to deter-
mine priorities in a traditionally governmental area. 182 Assuming for
limit powers conferred later, such as those granted under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment which are specifically directed to state action. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at
456. Thus the states consented such suits as Congress would authorize to enforce the
terms of the fourteenth amendment, by adopting the enforcement provision, section 5
of that amendment.
To summarize, it is the probable meaning of National League of Cities and
Fitzpatrick for future cases under the commerce clause, that Congress may condition a
state's participation in a proprietary activity upon amenability to federal court suit, but
may not substantially interfere with a state's governmental prerogatives. Under the
spending power, Congress may condition receipt of federal funds upon waiver of
eleventh amendment immunity to causes of action arising out of the use of those funds.
Finally, under the fourteenth amendment, Congress may unilaterally provide for pri-
vate federal actions against states, since the protection afforded by the eleventh
amendment is necessarily limited by the fourteenth.
'" 426 U.S. at 894, quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926).
18° 426 U.S. at 849.
18 ' This generalization is valid where the congressional regulation at issue was
adopted pursuant to Congress' power under the commerce clause, but would not apply
where the authority supporting the regulation stems from the spending power or from
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See note 178 supra.
182 426 U.S. at 852.
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the moment that a congressional intent to allow private suits against
state issuers of securities could be shown, it seems clear that imposing
the implied remedies under the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts upon states would have minimal impact upon a state's decision to
issue securities. Unlike the minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the FLSA which forced states either to increase revenues or to curtail
essential services,' 83 the imposition of the antifraud requirements
upon states when they issue securities would create no comparable
dilemma.'" The antifraud provisions require only that information
provided in connection with the sale of securities not be misleading.
Where the state issues securities, it 'presumably has access to—and
may verify the accuracy of—information concerning the security in
question. Moreover, since in order to obtain damages under the anti-
fraud provisions it is necessary to show an intent to deceive, manipu-
late or defraud on the defendant's part,'" imposition of a right to sue
states under the antifraud section is unlikely to interfere with a state's
decision to issue securities.
In addition, in order to find a federal statute invalid under the
policy of federalism set forth in National League of Cities, the interfer-
ence with a state's ability to carry on "functions essential to [its] sepa-
rate and independent existence"'" must be substantial.'" The
National League of Cities Court opinion makes it clear that some federal
regulations which only minimally disrupt a state's prerogatives are
permissible.'" Therefore, because the imposition of the antifraud re-
quirement of the Securities Acts upon states would not impair a state's
"ability to function effectively [with]in a federal system,"'" it would
seem that the policy of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment
would not preclude the application of this congressional regulation to
the states. Assuming this analysis is correct, if a state sold securi-
1" Id. at 846-47.
lul It could be argued that the threat of private federal suit for damages—not
the antifraud requirements themselves—would constitute an impermissible interference
with a state's prerogatives. If issuers were held strictly liable under the general anti-
fraud provisions for misrepresentations made, this argument would be compelling. But
the Supreme Court recently held that merely negligent conduct was insufficient to
ground an action for damages under the antifraud provision of the 1934 Act and indi-
cated that a showing of an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud on the defendant's
part would be required. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976) (The
Court left open whether reckless conduct might be sufficient to support civil liability in
some circumstances. Id. at 193 n.12). It is submitted that imposing this standard of care
upon states would not deter them from exercising their prerogative to issue securities
and therefore would not "impair the States' 'ability to function effectively [with)in a
federal system.'" National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
1" See note 184 supra.
tag
 426 U.S. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
Ig ' See 426 U.S. at 847, 849.
188 See id. at 853; S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45, reprinted in [1975)
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 221-23 (implying that the imposition of the antifraud pro-
visions on states is not an impermissible incursion upon states' prerogatives).
ta 9
 426 U.S. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
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ties after the effective date of the regulation, it would be held to
have impliedly consented to the terms of the regulation, and the
eleventh amendment would not bar a private suit against a state as
provided by the act.'""
In contrast, a congressional enactment imposing liability upon
states arising out of their regulation of their securities-issuing institu-
tions would probably greatly affect states' decisions in a traditionally
governmental area.'"' It is one thing to require a state not to mis-
represent facts when it sells or distributes its own securities; it is quite
another to render a state liable for the veracity of all information
supplied by corporations operating within the state. If' in Green, the
state could be held liable for the accuracy of the information made
public in its annual report, the state might be forced to decide not to
issue such reports, with the consequence that the state could no
longer provide any information for the protection of its citizens. To
impose upon a state the burden of guaranteeing the accuracy of in-
formation made public, especially when the information is based on
data submitted by private corporations, would force the state either to
increase greatly its ability to police the accuracy of' such information
or to forego issuing such information altogether. This interference
with a state's ability to make choices would probably be found to im-
permissibly "displace state policies regarding the manner in which [it]
will structure delivery of those governmental services which [its] citi-
zens require,"'"2 and therefore would be unconstitutional under the
doctrine of federalism elucidated in National League of Cities." 3 Thus
even if in Green the court had found a clear congressional intent to
provide for such suits, the application of the statute to states would
likely have been found unconstitutional by virtue of the tenth
amendment.'"
t" But see note 102 supra. If the sale of securities by a state is considered gov-
ernmental rather than proprietary, see note 164 supra, the Employees explicit intent test
must be used to determine if Congress intended to lift a state's eleventh amendment
immunity to suit. Since the jurisdictional sections of both Acts fail to explicitly provide
that a state may be sued, the eleventh amendment would bar suit. Furthermore, the
fact that the cause of action under the antifraud sections is implied, may prevent a
court from reaching the implied waiver question. See text at note 102 supra.
"' A state's regulation of its state chartered financial institutions would clearly
seem to be a traditionally governmental activity. See Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333,
336 (6th Cir. 1975). See text at note 157 supra.
'" 426 U.S. at 847.
'" A question yet to be confronted is whether the tenth amendment would pre-
clude federal regulation of a clearly governmental activity under the commerce clause,
but an activity in which a particular state had not yet engaged. That is, whether the fact
that a state could "voluntarily" submit to the regulation would be more important than
the characterization of the activity as governmental.
1 " The Natimal League of Cities decision was handed down on June 24, 1976,
only a month before the Tenth Circuit announced its decision in Green.
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CONCLUSION
It appears that the Green court was correct in affirming dismissal
of 4 private claim brought against the state of Utah under the se-
curities laws on the grounds that Utah had not waived its eleventh
amendment immunity to private federal suit. First, on the authority of
three Supreme Court decisions, it is clear that in order to find an im-
plied waiver of immunity under the securities laws, it must be shown
that Congress intended to subject states to private federal suit. Fur-
thermore, where the state's activity—in this case the regulation of
state chartered institutions—is a governmental function, a stricter test
must be applied to determine the existence of this congressional in-
tent. A close examination of the securities laws reveals no intent to lift
a state's eleventh amendment immunity when it regulates securities is-
suing institutions. Since this threshold congressional intent to subject a
state's regulatory activities to private federal suit is lacking in the Se-
curities Acts, it is clear that there can be no basis for finding an im-
plied waiver of immunity by the state of Utah.
The governmental/proprietary distinction developed in Parden
and Employees, and relied upon by the Tenth Circuit in Green, will con-
tinue to be utilized in eleventh amendment cases where suit is brought
against a state pursuant to a federal regulatory statute. Where the fed-
erally regulated state activity is a proprietary function, congressional
intent to authorize private suits against a state will be found where it
may reasonably be inferred from the purposes of the legislation. On
the other hand, where the regulated activity is historically governmen-
tal, Congress must explicitly provide in the statute that a state will be
liable to private federal suits; otherwise the state will not be held to
have waived its immunity to suit by engaging in the activity. In some
cases, however, it will not be apparent whether to classify a state's ac-
tivity as governmental or proprietary. These problems of classification
in gray areas will have to be solved on a case by case basis.
DAVID C. LUCAL
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